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Globalization and the Institutional Dynamics
of Global Environmental Governance
TUN MYINT*
ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with globalization and the institutional
dynamics of global environmental governance. How do the phenomena of
globalization shape the study of the institutional dimensions of global
environmental governance, and how do these phenomena influence the
practicality of law and state-centric politics? These questions guide the
direction of this paper and its aim to advance theories and research
methods for the study of the dynamics of institutions for governance. By
synthesizing the conceptual findings of the literature, this paper develops
an analytical framework of globalization and analytical themes to
advance the systematic study of the dynamics of institutions, which are
inherent in the design, function, and effectiveness of international and
global environmental institutions and governance.
INTRODUCTION
As we progress further into the twenty-first century, the
institutional order of the world is in the process of transformation. The
reasons are partially rooted in the changing attributes of the
biogeophysical world and the evolving phenomena of human values and
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cultures. Scholars maintain that this global transformation is due to the
increased momentum of global interdependence, democratization,
expansion of trade, technological innovation, and environmental
degradation.' This global transformation reconfigures the future of
nation-states, as well as the future of the international system as a
whole. Some of the major forces shaping the institutional architectures
of global environmental and societal changes are the phenomena of
globalization. This paper is concerned with the consequences of the
phenomena of globalization and the institutional dynamics of global
environmental governance. How do the phenomena of globalization
shape the study of the institutional dimensions of global environmental
governance and influence the practicality of law and state-centric
politics? These questions guide the direction of this analysis.
There is no universally agreed upon definition of globalization.
However, it is generally understood that globalization is one of the
major forces shaping the future of nation-states, as well as the future of
a state-centric world order.2 Because the phenomena of globalization are
transforming human institutions, globalization's impacts on human
institutions and human-environment interactions deserve systematic
study. Understanding how globalization shapes the practicality of state
sovereignty and the structure of state-centric world orders is useful in
order to formulate a research framework and advance methodologies to
analyze governance processes of social-ecological systems.3
1. See also Oran R. Young et al., The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems: An
Agenda for Scientific Research, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 304, 308 (2006) (arguing that
globalization is a central feature of coupled human-environment or socio-ecological
systems). See generally GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
GLOBALIZATION DEBATES (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2000) (collection of
essays and excerpts addressing, among other subjects, global interdependence,
democratization, and expansion of trade) [hereinafter GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER];
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM (Yoshukazu Sakamoto ed.,
1994) (discussing internationalization and democratization); LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS (Robert
0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995) (discussing global and local common-pool
resources); Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 INT'L SECURITY 115 (1995)
(debating the validity of the Westphalian model).
2. For discussions of globalization and state identities, see generally GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATION READER, supra note 1; GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER
AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
See also Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World 'Presidential
Address" 'American Political Science Association, 2000," 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (2001);
Young, supra note 1, at 307.
3. See Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-
Ecological Systems, 325 SCIENCE 419, 419-22 (July 24, 2009) (discussing analytical and
methodological definitions of social-ecological systems); Young, supra note 1, at 308
(discussing globalization of socio-ecological systems); Everett Dale Ratzlaff, Applications of
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In this paper, I explore how the phenomena of globalization may
shape scientific inquiry into the institutional dimensions of global
environmental and societal changes. First, I discuss four different
theses of globalization. Second, I identify five phenomena of
globalization. Third, I discuss the institutional dimensions of
globalization. Fourth, I discuss how these five phenomena of
globalization and the institutional dimensions of globalization shape
scientific inquiry into the institutional dimensions of global
environmental and societal changes. Finally, I argue that the analytical
framework needs to consider how the phenomena of globalization
characterize the institutional dynamics of global environmental
governance.
I. FOUR THESES OF GLOBALIZATION
The definition of globalization is broad. It conveys different
meanings in different contexts 4 because the fundamental ideas of
globalization are not born out of theory or philosophy; they are rooted in
the evolutional and historical events and aspirations of the people of the
world. The first humans migrating out of Africa, the Asian continental
people traveling over the ice bridge across the Bering Strait to the
Americas, the seaworthy Vikings sailing out of the Nordic region, Marco
Polo trading along the Silk Route, and Christopher Columbus landing in
the Americas are all examples of adventures and actions that shaped
the historical and institutional evolution of humankind. In this view,
globalization is an evolutionary phenomenon of human interactions at
multiple layers,5 creating conditions to further develop linkages and
interdependencies among all domains of societies, including the
economic, social, cultural, legal, and political realms. Understanding
Engineering Systems Analysis to the Human Social-Ecological System (Jan. 15, 1970)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, University of California, Davis) (on file with author) (using the
term "social-ecological system" to apply combined human and environmental systems);.
4. See also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993)
(defining globalization as "complex, dynamic legal and social processes" distinct from
concepts of universality or homogeneity); Jost DelbrAck, Globalization of Law, Politics,
and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 9, 9-11 (1993) (defining globalization as a "process of denationalization of
clusters of political, economic, and social activities" distinct from internationalization).
5. .Throughout this paper, I will use the term 'layer" to describe spatial scale such as
local, national, international, and global. I will use the term "level" to describe institutions
in the sense of rules such as collective choice rule, operational choice rule, constitutional
choice rule, and metaconstitutional choice rule. For a discussion of the levels of
institutions, see ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 54-62
(2005).
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this process will enable us to distinguish globalization from
internationalization, which is narrowly construed as state-to-state
relations. To treat and interpret globalization as internationalization is
to miss globalization's distinct meaning.6 Globalization challenges the
notion of state-centric international institutions and, in the context of
this paper, international environmental institutions.
The fundamental distinction between globalization and
internationalization is that "globalization denotes a process of
denationalization" and destatization, "whereas internationalization
refers to the cooperative activities of national actors."7 To some degree,
the causes and consequences of globalization are motivated by and
associated with the common good and bad of humanity and human
aspiration, whereas internationalization is largely motivated by
national interests that are dictated mostly by powerful states.8 "The key
feature which underlies the concept of globalization and distinguishes it
from internationalization is the erosion and irrelevance of national
boundaries in markets which can truly be described as global."9 In
assessing the debate over globalization, David Held puts forth three
theses of globalization: (1) the hyperglobalist thesis of globalization, (2)
the skeptic thesis of globalization, and (3) the transformationalist thesis
of globalization.' 0
I would add a fourth thesis of globalization. The fourth thesis is
embedded in the expression of the antiglobalization social movements
around the world. These social movements raise awareness of the
economic, political, and social consequences of globalization. I would dub
the fourth view of globalization as the standardization thesis. It states
that globalization is a standardization project of both hegemonic states
and their partners (e.g., multinational conglomerates and global
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) jointly advancing control over
people as citizens of a state-centric world and consumers of
conglomerate capitalism). In developing this thesis, I draw extensively
upon critiques of globalization, which treat globalization as a tool of
hegemony to expand its control over human orders.
These four theses explain the position and status of states and their
partners in the era of globalization. Understanding the states' and their
6. Delbriick, supra note 4, at 10; Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An
Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 380 (1996).
7. See Walker & Fox, supra note 6, at 380 (emphasis omitted).
8. Id.; see Delbruick, supra note 4, at 10-11.
9. Walker & Fox, supra note 6, at 380; see also KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE
NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 4-5 (1995) (discussing the increasing
irrelevance of states and state intervention in the global economy).
10. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
CULTURFE 2-9 (1999).
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partners' positions and statuses in globalization will enable us to
appreciate a meaningful distinction between internationalization under
a neoliberal economic order, controlled and commanded by states and
their partners, and societal orders, maintained by human associations
and relations across various types of borders and boundaries. These four
theses of globalization serve as a contextual background to understand
the five phenomena of globalization that are explored later in this
article.
A. The Hyperglobalist Thesis of Globalization
Hyperglobalists view globalization as advancing the political-
economic order of the world toward a post-state-centric system centered
on structures of conglomerate capitalist markets. Their view of
globalization begins with the thesis that globalization is "a new epoch of
human history in which traditional nation states have become
unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy."" This
view is based on the logic of the neoliberal economic order that
celebrates the emergence of a single global market, or "market
civilization" as some hyperglobalists would assert.12 For instance, the
way in which global capital inflows and outflows occur within and
across markets of nation-states is frequently cited as an example of
"borderless"1s behavior in a single global market that nation-states are
unable to control. Hyperglobalists also argue "that economic
globalization is constructing new forms of social organization . . . that
will eventually supplant traditional nation-states as the primary
economic and political units of world society."14
Globalization, according to the hyperglobalists, is "primarily an
economic phenomenon . . . [where] politics is no longer the art of the
possible but rather the practice of sound economic management."15
Therefore, for the hyperglobalists, "the rise of the global economy, the
emergence of institutions of global governance, and the global diffusion
and hybridization of cultures are interpreted as evidence of a radically
new world order, an order which prefigures the demise of the nation-
11. Id. at 3.
12. Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,
in THE GLOBALIZATION OF LIBERALISM 123, 123-24 (Eivind Hovden & Edward Keene eds.,
2002). Cf. Howard V. Perhmutter, On the Rocky Road to the First Global Civilization, 44
HUM. REL. 897, 897-903 (1991) (describing the changes and processes that the authors
view as indicative of a transition to the world's first global civilization).
13. See OHMAE, supra note 9, at 8, 57.
14. HELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.
15. Id. at 4.
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state."16 If we are living in the hyperglobalists' world, then regard for
nation-states as the fundamental subjects of international law is no
longet- useful because globalization has prefigured "the end of the nation
state."17 We might be living in a system where the "mercy" of the
market's "invisible hand" configures "the framework of human action."' 8
Yet, this hyperglobalist view is flawed in that it pretermits the
crucial alliance between states and conglomerate capitalists in building
market civilization. It is an improbable task for multinational
conglomerates to build what the hyperglobalists call "a new epoch of
human history" without crucial coordination between states. Karl
Polanyi calls this alliance between states and self-regulating market
structures the "double movement," which consolidates the logic of
market civilization.19 In this sense, the hyperglobalists' market
civilization cannot exist without these two fundamental institutions-
the state, as a regulator, and the market, as a presumably self-
regulating entity.
Hyperglobalists correctly state that globalization, to some extent,
contributes to the denationalization of various nation-states' policies
and laws. The point to clarify is that denationalization does not mean
the end of states and their roles in global politics. The hyperglobalists
have gone too far in arguing that globalization has ended the era of
nation-states because civilization has reached an era in which the
market governs human activities. According to hyperglobalists, Adam
Smith's thesis that the "invisible hand" governs human activities is the
proven source of global order. 20 Although hyperglobalists make an
explicit claim about the demise of nation-states in the global era, they
fail to offer an explicit policy prescription for maintaining global order in
their supposed single global market. One could assume that the market
will govern itself and order will be preserved as consequences of market-
oriented economic activities. But the fallacy of the hyperglobalists'
16. Id. (citing MARTIN ALBROW, THE GLOBAL AGE: STATE AND SOCIETY BEYOND
MODERNITY (1996); EVAN LUARD, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POLITICS: THE CHANGED Focus
OF POLITICAL ACTION IN THE MODERN WORLD (1990); OHMAE, supra note 9).
17. OHMAE, supra note 9.
18. ALBROW, supra note 16, at 85.
19. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND EcONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 136 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944) (discussing society's development of
defense mechanisms to curb the expansion of the market economy and the resulting social
dislocation).
20. See also OHMAE, supra note 9 (arguing that nation-states no longer control regional
economies); see generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Picador 2007) (2005) (arguing that the global economy
operates on a level playing field following the same set of rules, not of states but of
globalization).
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argument is rooted in its monocentric view of globalization that is
defined solely within the domain of economic activities. Globalization is
not only an economic phenomenon, but it is also a phenomenon rooted in
multifaceted human activities in all key domains of society--cultural,
economic, educational, legal, political, and social. The hyperglobalists'
conception of globalization as a largely singular process equated mainly
with economic interconnectedness, fails to connect various dimensions of
globalization with the multiple domains of society. 21
B. The Skeptic Thesis of Globalization
Skeptics argue that globalization is not a new or historically
unprecedented phenomenon. Their arguments rely on global statistical
evidence showing the flows of trade, investments, and labor that have
occurred predominantly between the national economies of the
Westphalian state-centric world system. They describe globalization,
which is nothing more than the integration of national economies that
has been happening since the beginning of the nineteenth century, as an
exaggerated "myth."22 Skeptics contend that the hyperglobalists' thesis
of globalization is fundamentally flawed and politically naive because
hyperglobalists underestimate the enduring power of national
governments to regulate international economic activity.
Therefore, the skeptics' world is not a globalized world, but rather
an internationalized world where states still play the central role of
regulating economic activities. In the skeptics' world, state-centric
international laws and policies are still made by the power and legality
of sovereign states, and states are the key actors in maintaining world
order. The skeptics' view mirrors the realist view, where states are
pivotal institutions in organizing world order. Although the skeptics'
view is partially right in asserting that globalization is not a new
phenomenon, it fails to consider the relatively recent, but
transformative, intensity and magnitude of the impacts of globalization
in all domains of human society. This transformative intensity and
magnitude of globalization is due to the resilience of human aspiration
and human curiosity about the world. By contrast, the state itself is a
relatively recent phenomenon in human societies and history.23
21. See generally KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN
THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY 180-217 (1990).
22. E.g., PAUL HIRST, GRAHAME THOMPSON & SIMON BROMLEY, GLOBALIZATION IN
QUESTION 2-4 (Polity Press 3d ed. 2009) (1996).
23. See ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 166-68 (Doubleday 1955) (1946)
(explaining that Machiavelli was the first thinker to truly appreciate the meaning behind
the new political structure of the "state').
401
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
Currently, states and their partners are eager to "regulate" or control
this human curiosity and aspiration within the fictitious notion of power
that they aspire to retain in a state-centric, internationalized world.
This view could provide a powerful argument for the skeptics, which
would still support their "internationalized world," where states play
the central role of regulating economic activities. If they recognized that
globalization is a consequence of human aspiration to control the
surrounding world, which leads to standardization of things, artifacts,
and human beings into parts and parcels of supposedly predictable
orders, they could then posit the following: at the center of these orders,
the Leviathan state fictitiously emerged as a central force of organizing
human security and order. In this argument, even while recognizing
globalization and its origins, the state can remain at the center of
human order. To do so, states, like many other human institutions, will
have to adapt to new conditions brought by globalization.
C. The Transformationalist Thesis of Globalization
The transformationalists view globalization as an evolutionary
process that serves as "a central driving force behind the rapid social,
political, and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and
world order."24 In the view of transformationalists, the ways and speed
in which the processes of globalization reshape modern societies and
world orders are historically unprecedented. Unlike hyperglobalists and
skeptics, transformationalists make no claims about the future
trajectory of globalization so as to predict where global order is heading.
Transformationalists believe, however, that globalization "is
reconstituting or 're-engineering' the power, functions, and authority of
national governments." 25 Although transformationalists would not
dispute the fact "that states still retain the ultimate legal claim 'to
effective supremacy over what occurs within their own territories,'
[they] argue that this is juxtaposed . . . with the expanding jurisdiction
of institutions . . . of international governance and constraints of
obligations from international law."26 This denotes the fact that states
in the era of globalization are unable to make policy decisions and laws
based solely on domestic political and social factors. This fact is
transforming the ways in which a state is able to act on its own national
interests without interfering with the interests of others.
24. HELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 7 (citing MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE
NETWORK SOCIETY (1996)); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY
(1990); JAN AART SCHOLTE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1993)).
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
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In contrast to the hyperglobalist and skeptic theses, - the
transformationalist thesis of globalization captures the overarching
scheme of the process of globalization. Transformationalists tend to see
globalization as a multifaceted contextual phenomenon of human
civilization. In this respect, they are able to explain the transforming
roles of states and the concept of sovereignty as reconfigured, rather
than diminished, as in the hyperglobalist view, or as in the skeptic view
where "nothing has really changed." In the transformationalist view,
"world order can no longer be conceived as purely state-centric" because
decision-making authority "has become increasingly diffused among
public and private agencies at the local, national, regional, and global
layers."27 Nation-states are no longer the sole centers or principal forms
of governance or authority in the world. Thus globalization, in the
transformationalist view, is changing the ways in which states and
nonstate actors influence each other and shape political and governing
processes within states and the international arena.28
In the transformationalists' world, the state's central governance
concern is how it can best readjust its economic, legal, political, and
social structures to meet the challenge of globalization. However, to be
able to outline strategies for governance in the globalization era,
transformationalists must at least presume into what type of
trajectories globalization might lead the world order in the future. This
is the principal shortcoming of the transformationalist thesis of
globalization. Because transformationalists fail to project or define
globalization in terms of where it will lead the world order, they are
crippled in prescribing strategies that various global actors should take.
For example, hyperglobalists have implicitly proposed that market
forces should govern a single global market. However,
transformationalists accept the fact that globalization is transforming
and reconstituting the power and authority of national governments.
They assert that a new "sovereign regime" is displacing conceptions of
statehood as an "absolute, indivisible, territorially exclusive and zero-
sum form of public power."29 Therefore, in the world of the
transformationalists, the traditional law-making authority of states is
weakened, and states have to yield to the pressure and interests of
nonstate actors and international institutions. Perhaps this is where
transformationalists have the advantage over hyperglobalists and
skeptics because this conception is a crucial foundation for
27. Id. at 9.
28. See JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING
GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD 403-12 (1997).
29. HELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 (citing David A. Held, Democracy, the Nation-
State, and the Global System, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 197 (David A. Held ed., 1991)).
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understanding new institutions for the organization of governance in a
complex world.
D. The Standardization Thesis of Globalization
The standardization thesis of globalization is the most enticing
thecity of globalization. It views globalization as a project of
standardizers who seek to comprehend and control their worlds.30 In
this view, standardizers are hegemonic nation-states, monoculture-and-
monovernacular-promoting NGOs, and conglomerate multinational
corporations who command and control the neoliberal economic and
state-centric order of the world. I believe that the standardization thesis
is one of the most powerful critiques of globalization because of its logic,
which begins with how humans construct their world for predictability
and legibility, aiming to control the uncertainties of a nonergodic
world. 31 James C. Scott, one of the strongest critics of state leaders and
their subjects for thinking and acting like states, contends that
globalization is a logical tool for hegemonic states and groups to expand
total control over resources and people across the globe.32 In treating
globalization as a tool to expand the hegemonic position of states and
groups, Scott conveys that the process of globalization requires
eliminating indigenous languages and cultures that stand in the way of
hegemony's expansion.33
The standardization thesis focuses on what globalization may
eliminate, diminish, or replace, such as diverse human institutions,
religions, cultures, and vernaculars. This is because local, indigenous,
and tacit vernacular practices all stand in the way of standardization.
While standardization theorists acknowledge globalization's benefits,
they also argue that the disappearance or transformation of these
indigenous institutions, religions, cultures, and vernacular practices is
30. See generally James C. Scott, Vernaculars Cross-Dressed as Universals:
Globalization as North Atlantic Hegemony, 24 MACALESTER IN'L 3 (2009) (discussing the
standardization theory of globalization).
31. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
(2005) (discussing how human societies face dilemmas in establishing predictable patterns
and orders).
32. See JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 19-22 (1998).
33. Scott, supra note 30, at 3-9; see also Michael Goldman, The Birth of a Discipline:
Producing Authoritative Green Knowledge, World Bank-Style, 2 ETHNOGRAPHY 191 (2001)
(analyzing the World Bank's Nam Theun 2 dam project in Laos as an illustration of
hegemonic behaviors of dominant groups who treat indigenous institutions as roadblocks
to standardization).
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the "dark side of standardization."34 As a hegemonic power looksAto
assert its influence on a people or a state, the hegemon needs a different
form of order. The forms of order that are embedded in "local knowledge,
however quaint, [are] illegible" and stand in the way of . the
standardization project.35
Among others, Scott provides several conceptual examples to
illustrate the processes of standardization and discuss its dark side.36
For example, in the United States, the Dawes Act of 1887 granted land
titles and property rights to Native Americans by removing them from
their tribal institutions and making them subject to the laws of the
standardizers. Property deeds and land records also required a
standardized form of identification, which helped assimilate Native
Americans into the institutions of the standardizers. In this process of
standardization, the institutions of the standardizers replaced the
Native Americans' institutions.
After outlining specific examples, such as the Dawes Act of 1887,
Scott then generalizes about the identity of the standardizers behind
these antivernacular processes. He asserts:
The neo-liberal new order, I believe, can be usefully seen
as a vast anti-vernacular machine. Its immanent logic,
never fully realized, is to replicate the institutional order
and practices of the developed, liberal democracies of the
North Atlantic . . .. The institutional lords of this project
are the great multinational institutions controlled by
these liberal democracies: the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization
(WTO), European Union (EU), and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).37
Scott then puts forth the view that these bodies are perceived to be
promoting "harmonization" and "standardization" under the auspices of
"cosmopolitan universals."38 Scott extends his argument:
They are, of course, anything but universals. Any
practice, any institution that becomes internationally
hegemonic, began, once, as vernacular practice at a
particular time and in a particular place. Most of the
34. Scott, supra note 30, at 3.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 3-19.
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. Id. at 25.
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practices we are describing are the vernacular practices
and institutions of North Atlantic capitalist democracies,
now "cross-dressed" as cosmopolitan universals.39
In this view, globalization is a vehicle for standardization projects
undertaken by hegemonic groups.
The standardization thesis raises two fundamental puzzles about
the sources and dynamics of human institutions. The first puzzle is
about the areas of human affairs that need standardization to make life
more predictable and enjoyable. For instance, the evolutions of road
names in Durham and Guilford, Connecticut, which Scott uses in his
illustration of standardization, demonstrate the first puzzle. 40
Historically, the majority of roads in small towns across America were
named according to where the roads lead or what the roads meant in
the local knowledge base. For instance, for the residents of Durham, the
road leading to Guilford was known as Guilford Road. Similarly, for the
residents of Guilford, the road leading to Durham was known as
Durham Road. If we imagine each neighboring town surrounding
Durham calling the road leading to Durham "Durham Road," we can see
the problem for modern organized society with hospital ambulance
services, highway patrol, and postal services. The majority of these
historical names have been replaced by route numbers and categories of
roads (i.e., local roads, county roads, state roads, and national
highways) that are familiar to modern dwellers. In the case of roads, it
is perhaps better to be standardized for the sake of expediting
ambulance services to save lives and to simplify driving directions.
However, this standardization occurred at the expense of local
knowledge and histories. In addition, standardization also creates the
potential danger of the reach of oppressive state leaders who might take
power by military coup and exercise raw power to control populations,
since roads are essential for such an operation. This is the first puzzle
raised by the standardization thesis: Which areas of human livelihoods
are better when standardized and which are not?
The second puzzle deals with the attractiveness of having a center of
power, a center of order, or gargantuan organizations governing human
affairs. It is concerned with the consequences of human desire and the
need to control, to some extent, other people and resources to increase
predictability and order for the standardizers. Why do people need a
place of power from where leaders and other institutions rule to provide
order in their livelihoods? The standardization thesis provides a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4-5.
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conceptual framework to understand both the need for and the danger
of standardization in organizing human order. Globalization, in the
standardizationist view, is rooted in anthropocentric and near universal
human desire to control the nonergodic world41 and predict the future.
In that sense, globalization is a conceptual framework that serves as a
vehicle to justify standardization and organize orders in the vernacular
of the standardizers.
The weakness of the standardization thesis lies in three
oversimplified assumptions about human institutions. First, it assumes
that physically larger entities always dominate and control the world
order. The forces and power of standardization are largely attached to
states and larger entities, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, but this is far from the reality in human societies and
ecosystems. Second, the standardization thesis assumes that power
corrupts, yet human aspiration is not that simple. Not every powerful
individual and entity desires to dominate or acts like a hegemon. Third,
it assumes that globalization is a unidirectional phenomenon. The forces
of globalization are mainly assumed to resonate in hegemonic entities
such as nation-states. These forces are then assumed to dominate and
eliminate smaller and weaker cultures and societies. This is also far
from the reality of a globalized world, where both smaller entities and
larger entities influence one another in a complex exchange. While the
standardization thesis has a more normative force and sharper critique
of globalization, these three assumptions weaken its force, giving rise to
logical questions about globalization's role in transformation and the
dynamics of human societies.
The remainder of this article will examine the phenomena of
globalization from the conceptual frameworks of the standardizationists
and the transformationalists, in part because the hyperglobalist and
skeptic perspectives offer limited insight into the institutional
consequences of globalization phenomena. However, these two views
serve as cautionary tales against falling into the panacea of
institutional transformation all across the globe. In the following
section, I will discuss the phenomena of globalization in the
transformationalist and standardizationist views.
II. THE FIVE PHENOMENA OF GLOBALIZATION
For analytical purposes, it is helpful to frame the institutional
consequences of globalization in the context of the "phenomena" of
globalization (see Figure I below). Using these phenomena to analyze
41. NORTH, supra note 31, at 11-15.
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how globalization is challenging the sovereignty of the traditional
nation-state and the state-centric world order,42 we will observe the
challenges globalization imposes on the state-centric world order. If we
consider how these phenomena of globalization characterize multilayer
institutional arrangements of social and ecological systems, we can,
perhaps, generate hypotheses about the extent to which the challenges
from globalization impose institutional dimensions of global
environmental and societal changes. It is helpful to connect the five
phenomena of globalization to institutional consequences of
globalization, as shown in Figure I below.
Based on the considerable insight of the literature on globalization,
I would assert that there are at least five clear phenomena related to
the institutional dimensions of globalization: (1) globalization fosters
the existence of global infrastructure; (2) it creates the harmonization of
institutions at multiple layers and scales; (3) it diffuses the
jurisdictional and political borders of nation-states; (4) it facilitates the
global diffusion of identity, culture, and ideas; and (5) it encourages a
process of denationalization or destatization.
A. Fostering Global Infrastructure
Nation-states and nonstate entities are now facing external
challenges from the process of global infrastructure adjustment. The
World Wide Web, the global financial market, and telecommunication
infrastructures are just some of the global infrastructures over which
nation-states lack absolute control. These global infrastructures invade
nation-states' systems and gradually weaken the sovereign control of
information flow and collective citizen actions. The ongoing policy
challenges facing nation-states attempting to control or censor the
Internet reveals states' ambiguous position in coping with challenges
from global infrastructure adjustment. The impacts of global
infrastructure on social systems, such as nation-states and local
communities, have a direct, if not simultaneous, effect on ecological
systems at multiple scales. In fostering global infrastructure,
globalization promotes the harmonization of institutions.
42. See generally OHMAE, supra note 9, at 1-5 (setting out the argument that
globalization has rendered nation-states unsuitable as economic units in favor of what
Ohmae terms "region states").
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B. Harmonization of Institutions
Institutions at multiple layers of the political and economic order of
the world, such as international organizations, nation-states, and local
communities, are now under pressure from the pervasive market
economy to harmonize their economic activities and policies.- For
instance, nation-states in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN), the EU, and NAFTA are all in the process of harmonizing
areas of their economic policy toward a more regional-market-friendly
environment. To some extent, this harmonizing is occurring globally.
The world market, for example, is becoming more global since the
Uruguay Round of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, which led to the creation of the WTO. These challenges will
intensify and create profound impacts on the making of national policy
to harmonize with international standards. Meanwhile, the
international competition for production and the competition to gain
global financial access also pressure national policies to be harmonious
with international policy. In some cases, nation-states are forced to copy
and implement the policies drawn up by international institutions, such
as the World Bank and the IMF.43
Harmonization of national policies also occurs when nation-states
integrate their policies. Gradual regional integration of ASEAN and the
EU is the most advanced phenomenon of the harmonization of national
policies through regional integration policy frameworks. Understanding
the extent to which the harmonization of policies across a set of nation-
states affects institutional diversity and compatibility requires a
systematic investigation of linkages, networks, and multilayer
arrangements. In addition, it requires a deeper investigation of the
consequences of centralization, decentralization, interplay, and fit
among institutions. This cluster of harmonization mechanisms
addresses the consequences of globalization as standardization affects
institutional diversity and compatibility.
C. Diffusion of Jurisdictional and Political Borders
Globalization challenges the notion of political borders drawn
between nation-states. Some scholars, for instance, argue that for a
process to be qualified as "globalization," there must be evidence that
the existence of national or other important boundaries have become
43. For example, IMF financial packages proffered with conditions were given to
Mexico after the peso crises in 1995, and to Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea after the 1997
Asian financial crisis.
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irrelevant. 44 The ASEAN Vision 2020 and the goals of the EU after 1992
are both examples of where the political borders of nation-states and
local communities are becoming ever less relevant to citizens' daily
lives. Diffusion of borders can still be a subjective argument of
globalization, but in the world market today, the international economic
system behaves as a single, unified economic system, despite the
continued existence of formal national boundaries. This diffusion
creates the fluidity of political space and thus challenges the practicality
of legal jurisdictions and boundaries.
Diffusion of jurisdictional and political borders is also induced by
the activities of nonstate actors such as multinational corporations,
international NGOs, and social movements. For instance, villagers in
the eastern part of Burma caught up in gas pipeline projects initiated by
Total, a French energy company and the Union Oil Company of
California (UNOCAL), a U.S. energy company, were able to initiate
lawsuits in a federal court in Los Angeles against UNOCAL.45 The
villagers from Burma reached a favorable outcome in the case when
UNOCAL agreed to settle. The villagers' lawsuit was possible because of
the diffusion of ideas and jurisdictional borders. The Doe v. UNOCAL
case illustrates the fundamental nature of the diffusion of jurisdictional
borders and ideas enforcing corporate social responsibility, particularly
in the area of human rights. As jurisdictional and political borders
become diffused, fundamental tenets of human agency such as cultures,
national identities, and ideas are also diffused through globalization.
D. Diffusion of Culture, Identities, and Ideas
Global diffusion of culture, ethnic identity, and ideas is another
phenomenon of globalization. This phenomenon fosters the spread of
initially localized practices throughout the globe. Some examples of
global diffusion include the presence of McDonald's, an American fast
food giant, in Tiananmen Square and the increasing number of Chinese
restaurants across America. The notion of being able to grab
prepackaged sushi in a conventional Midwestern grocery store would
have seemed like science fiction only forty years ago. Even racial or
ethnic identities are diffused through interracial marriages, friendship,
cultural acquisition, and migration. Indeed, the international movement
of people (i.e., migration) has imposed a profound challenge to national
identity and the notion of citizenship. For instance, Delbriick argues
44. See generally OHMAE, supra note 9, at 3-48.
45. Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also William J.
Aceves, International Decision: Doe v. UNOCAL, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 309 (1998) (analyzing
the court's decision in the case and explaining its significance).
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that "[w]ith the change of many European nations into de facto
immigration countries, the traditional understanding of what
constitutes the 'nation' or the 'State people' is no longer tenable."46 How
this diffusion of culture, identities, and ideas across the globe shapes
institutional change and diversity must be incorporated into the study
of the effects of globalization on institutional dimensions of global
environmental and societal changes.
The most common perception about cultural diffusion of
globalization is that the world cultures are dominated by the culture of
globalizers through the diffusion process. This diffusion process is
widely believed to have been brought by economic integration through
trade and communication technology. For instance, Benjamin Barber
asserts that diffusion occurs "by the onrush of economic and ecological
forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the
world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food-with MTV,
Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially
homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology,
ecology, communications, and commerce." 47 There are two important
consequences to global social changes due to this diffusion process. The
first is that of the standardization thesis, which claims that the world's
cultures are homogenized by globalizers. The second consequence is that
the diffusion of cultures, identities, and ideas tend to reduce the
diversity in the world as world cultures are homogenized by dominant
ones. Scholarly research to understand the circumstances under which
the smaller cultures and identities diminish or thrive against dominant
ones is needed to understand the consequences of the diffusion of
cultures, identities, and ideas. What is certain is that these diffusions
widen the structure of human preferences, choices, and incentives,
thereby extending the behavioral frameworks of human actions and
interactions beyond the familiar borders of institutions."4 The major
46. Jost Delbrilck, Global Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the
Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 46 (1994) (internal citation
omitted).
47. Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. Mc World, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1992.
48. See, e.g., PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC POLITICS 99-
104 (1996) (discussing the diffusion of ideas as it relates to grassroots environmental
activism and the ability of transnational environmental activism to "reorient the ...
political dimensions of rural life"); Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics:
The Implications of Massachusetts' "Burma Law," 115 POL. SCI. Q. 353, 356-64 (2000)
(discussing the influence of international affairs on domestic state law and policy, as well
as the increasing involvement of transnational corporations and NGOs in lawmaking and
policy decisions); Matthew 0. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, Diffusion of Behavior and
Equilibrium Properties in Network Games, 97 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 92 (2007)
(discussing diffusion's effect on social structures).
411
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
consequence of this widening of human preferences, choices, and
incentives is denationalization or the destatization process of
globalization.
E. Denationalization and Destatization
Along with the diffusion of people and culture, the identity of the
nation-state and its institutional attributes are being challenged in both
economic and political domains. The emergence of the euro currency and
the idea of a European citizenship identity are examples of the
processes of globalization denationalizing nation-states in Europe. For
fear of losing national identity and traditional culture, some national
governments, including the governments of Burma, China, and
Singapore, have attempted to block global cultural influences,
propagated by multimedia, movies, and the Internet. The concept of the
so-called "Asian Value" has been promoted to justify their attempts to
curtail access to global information. 49 The traditional concept of national
identity is increasingly scrutinized now due to the nature of global
society, wherein people can easily access information about different
countries and cultures. Globalization in general sets conditions for
states to engage in outward-looking policies to redefine state
sovereignty and power in the global age.
In all layers of human governance-individual, household,
neighborhood, local, subnational, national, international, and global-
the ways in which individuals and groups interact and organize
governance processes changes over time. The five phenomena of
globalization have altered the attributes of institutions at multiple
layers of human governance and changed the rules of human
interaction. Global expansion of individual freedoms, innovations in
telecommunication technology, and the global architecture of the
Internet have aided the intensification of these phenomena of
globalization. In the following section, I will analyze how these five
phenomena relate to the attributes of institutions.
49. For discussion about the "Asian Value" and liberal democracy, see Surain
Subramaniam, The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal
Democracy, 27 ASIAN AFF. 19 (2000). For a critique of "Asian Value," see Amartya Sen,
Human Rights and Asian Values, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14-21, 1997, at 33.
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION ON INSTITUTIONAL
ATTRIBUTES
Globalization has imposed four consequences on institutional
architectures: (1) institutional change, (2) institutional diversity and
complexity, (3) institutional compatibility, and (4) institutional
robustness (see Figure I below). These four dynamic aspects are
fundamental to the architecture of human institutions, which are
designed to govern common pool resources, such as rivers and forests.
These four institutional attributes shape the dynamics of human-
environment interactions. Globalization's impact on these four dynamic
aspects needs to be unpacked into analytical themes.
A. Institutional Changes
Institutional change is strongly associated with institutional
adaptation, transformation, leapfrogging, hybridization, speed, and
scale. Denationalization or destatization is one of the major
consequences of globalization, and it has induced institutional changes
for both nation-state and state-centric international organizations.
Institutional changes occur in many different steps, from adaptation to
transformation. Some institutions incorporate with others in order to
meet the challenges of globalization. Hybridization occurs when
institutions evolve into new functional forms without relinquishing the
central characteristics of their original forms, which serves as part of
the new institutional design. For instance, a modern national
constitution incorporating indigenous institutions and contemporary
rule of law is a hybrid institution.
Hybridization has been a major aspect of globalization, in areas as
diverse as music, culture, food, and technology. For instance, if one
visits different global fast food giants, such as KFC or A&W in some
areas of Bangkok, one can order fried chicken served with rice in lieu of
French fries. If one listens to a composition by Ravi Shankar, a well-
known Indian musician, one notes significant hybridization of sounds
and instruments. In the automobile market, hybrid or crossover cars,
SUVs, and vans have gained consumers' attention in response to rising
gas prices and changing consumer preferences. In modern warfare, a
hybrid army from the United States-a combination of soldiers from the
U.S. Army and personnel from private security firms-is engaged in
war in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this case, the trend of privatization
may have caused hybridization of institutions.
Hybrid institutions exist in the legal realm as well. For instance, in
South Africa, the rule of law and traditional customary laws coexist to
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govern social and political problems.50 Hybridization of institutions in
the Rhine river basin is another example. When the International
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine introduced the Rhine Action
Program (RAP) in 1986, the original forms of institutional
arrangements among riparian states were kept intact as described in
the language of two 1976 Rhine conventions. The RAP, as a hybrid
institution, recognized the roles of nonstate actors such as industries,
environmental NGOs, and citizens.5'
Within the literature of institutional changes vis-A-vis
environmental institutions, there is a relevant policy question of
institutional leapfrogging. 52 Can societies that lag behind in developing
institutions to address environmental governance adopt environmental
institutions that were developed and successfully implemented long ago
in other societies? If institutional leapfrogging is possible, then
institutional experts from developed societies are highly valuable and
could transplant copies of institutional designs that are well developed
and functioning effectively in home societies to host societies. An
affirmative answer to this policy question will be valuable for policy
consultants and experts around the world. However, institutional
change does not always occur in simple steps of adaptation,
leapfrogging, or transformation. Under what circumstances is
institutional leapfrogging possible? Why are some societies successful in
leapfrogging, while others are not? How do the five phenomena of
globalization affect institutional change? These theoretical and
empirical questions beg more investigation into the nature and origins
of institutional changes, as scholars address institutional dimensions of
global environmental change.
B. Institutional Diversity
One of the consequences of globalization for human institutions is
that it can either induce or reduce institutional diversity. The
phenomena of globalization induce institutional diversity by pressuring
monocentric arrangements to loosen up for alternative arrangements.
Meanwhile, the phenomena of globalization can reduce institutional
50. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 12, 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/
constitution/1996/index.htm.
51. See Tun Myint, Democracy in Global Environmental Governance: Issues, Interests,
and Actors in the Mekong and the Rhine, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 287, 309-13
(2003).
52. Tushaar Shah, Ian Makin & R. Sakthivadivel, Limits to Leapfrogging: Issues in
Transposing Successful River Basin Management Institutions in the Developing World, in
INTERSECTORAL MANAGEMENT OF RIvER BASINS 89, 90 (Charles L. Abernethy ed., 2001).
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diversity when monocentric actors fear that the phenomena of
globalization may have negative effects on the identity of their society.
Consequently, consolidation of institutions and identity has become a
mechanism to reduce diversity. One of the questions that needs to be
addressed to understand the relationship between globalization and
institutional diversity is why and under what circumstances do the
phenomena of globalization induce institutional diversity. The presence
of institutional diversity can be detected by examining whether the
institutional architecture is based on a polycentric structure of
institutional arrangement or a monocentric structure of institutional
arrangement. The analytical themes within institutional diversity are
institutional linkages across different scales, networks, and
multilayered structures.
Institutional linkages show the existence of distinct authority,
accountability, responsibility, roles, and rights of actors across multiple
layers of institutions. In a monocentric system, these distinctions are
almost irrelevant because authority, accountability, responsibility, roles,
and rights are concentrated at the central entity. The structure of
military command and control, especially during the conduct of war, is
probably the best example of a monocentric institution, aside from
absolute monarchical and dictatorial systems. The linkages are central
features of networks of diverse institutions that exist in a more
polycentric system. The dynamics of these networks are critical
elements of institutional diversity. Another central feature of
institutional diversity can be detected through the existence of
multilayered structures and nested structures of institutions within
each layer. Multilayered and nested institutional structures struggle for
compatibility among them. Therefore, it is important to understand how
phenomena of globalization influence institutional compatibility.
C. Institutional Compatibility
If institutional diversity is a fact of human life for many societies,
then how do diverse institutions coexist in a society? The modern
history of military coups in Thailand is one example of persistent
institutional clashes between monarchy and democracy. The monarchy,
as a centralized institution, is often in direct conflict with democracy, a
functionally decentralized institution. The history of military coups in
Thailand since it became a constitutional monarchy in 1939
demonstrates the significance of institutional incompatibility as a
problematic tension between centralized and decentralized institutions.
Institutional compatibility is also one of the central problems in
building democratic regimes in many other societies. The institutional
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compatibility problem is further shaped by the phenomena of
globalization, especially harmonization of institutions and development
of global infrastructures.
Institutional compatibility problems persist in dense institutional
environments where multiple institutions interact around a particular
governance issue. When institutions encounter a persistent problem of
fit, there is a need to be compatible because the alternative is
institutional clash. The harmonization aspects of globalization induce
institutional compatibility by either fostering global institutional
infrastructures that are congruent with diverse institutions or requiring
the harmonization of institutions. However, the diffusion of culture and
boundaries could either induce or hinder institutional compatibility.
D. Institutional Robustness
While no institution is robust in a permanent sense, the study of
robustness of institutions is a valuable endeavor for understanding how
the phenomena of globalization affect institutions. Literature
addressing the systematic investigation of institutional resilience, 3
vulnerabilities, scale, regime effectiveness, designs, and multilevel
structure of institutions has much to offer in this respect. 54 As
illustrated in Figure I below, among the five phenomena of
globalization, the diffusion of culture, ideas, and identities and the
diffusion of jurisdictional and political borders tend to reduce the
robustness of institutions. The harmonization or integration (i.e., not
consolidation) of institutions is an attempt to build robustness. Whether
robust institutions are effective in solving particular environmental
governance problems has been one of the central concerns of regime
effectiveness studies. While an institution may be robust, it may not
53. Resilience is a property of a robust institution. Robustness encompasses the
healthy state of an institution. Resilience represents institutional property that enables
an institution to recover from shocks. For example, the Obama Administration's stimulus
package is an institutional mechanism of resilience used to recover from the shock
imposed on the overall health and robustness of the U.S. economy.
54. On institutional dimensions of global environmental governance, see ORAN R.
YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY,
AND SCALE (2002). On design and resilience of institutions, see ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990). On linkage and scale, see LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE:
HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN Two DOMAINS (Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom
eds., 1995). On resilience and transformation of institutions, see PANARCHY:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS (Lance H.
Gunderson & C. S. Holling eds., 2002). On the scholarly progress of the study of
institutions, see COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, THE DRAMA OF
THE COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
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adequately address some social dilemmas, such as providing equity
jurisprudence. Locating institutions within multilevel networks or
polycentric structures tends to increase institutional robustness. Some
multilevel institutional structures, such as federalism generally, the
organization of the Swiss Federation, and the structure of the EU, are
examples of institutional arrangements that tend to address the
institutional robustness problem. To some degree, the multilevel
arrangement also fends off the negative consequences of the effects of
globalization.
IV. ANALYTICAL THEMES
To identify the analytical themes of the effects of globalization on
institutional dimensions of global, environmental, and societal changes,
it is important to understand how the phenomena of globalization
influence characteristics of institutional architectures (i.e., change,
diversity, compatibility, and robustness) at multiple layers, from local to
global. The clusters of analytical themes illustrated in Figure I below
are not an exhaustive list. However, these analytical themes are driving
forces in the literature on international and global environmental
institutions.
Using illustrations in Figure I below, I will briefly explain how the
five phenomena of globalization discussed in preceding sections relate to
the analytical themes. How do these five phenomena of globalization
relate to the analytical themes of institutional dimensions of global
environmental change? How do these analytical themes relate to one
another? To be more specific, for instance, how does institutional
adaptation under the characteristic of institutional change relate to
institutional resilience under the characteristic of institutional
robustness? These analytical themes will guide assessment of the
influence of globalization on institutional dynamics of global
environmental governance.
There is a significant amount of literature from multiple academic
disciplines that addresses these analytical themes. However, the
existing literature on globalization tends to treat it as mainly a macro-
conceptual phenomenon that only occurs at the global layer. I framed
globalization in this paper as consisting of human phenomena that
shape questions of governance and order at multiple layers. To
understand the forces that globalization exerts on governance, we need
to treat it as a dynamic force that affects institutional dynamics at
multiple layers, from individual to global. This approach is far more
important in the study of global environmental governance, which
addresses the consequences of individual behaviors and livelihoods and
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imp6ses direct consequences on social-ecological systems to the
behaviors and livelihoods of communities at multiple layers. The
analytical themes serve as a theoretical lens to unpack the effects of
globalization on institutional dynamics.
As a preliminary attempt to conceptualize the relationships between
analytical themes, I identified their sources in the characteristics of
institutions (e.g., "institutional characteristics" in Figure I below).
Figure I illustrates how the five phenomena of globalization affect
attributes of institutions. The analytical themes show how each of the
institutional attributes may be analyzed. If we want to understand how
globalization influences the institutional dynamics of governance, I
would posit that a systematic study of institutional dimensions of
global, environmental, and societal changes needs to effectively address
the analytical themes that are identified in this conceptual map.
CONCLUSION
This paper has illustrated that it is insufficient to theorize
globalization from a single academic discipline. The weakness of such an
attempt is discussed in four theses of globalization. At the same time, it
is also incomplete to theorize globalization from a point of view of a
single scale or domain of society. Theorizing globalization from only the
point of view of a nation-state or a multinational corporation or an NGO
misses multifaceted dimensions that are rooted in the changing nature
of cultures, identities, and ideas originating in the aspiration and
livelihoods of individuals and groups. This theoretical puzzle is
congruent with global public policy dilemmas faced in governing global
environmental problems that require solutions at local, national, and
international layers to address global problems. Designing an
institution from a point of view of either a local or national or
international layer to address global environmental problems will not be
sufficient to achieve projected goals of global environmental governance.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the phenomena of globalization
and how the phenomena affect institutional dynamics that structures
preferences and incentives of individuals and groups.
In so doing, this paper discussed the five phenomena of globalization
and how these phenomena affect characteristics of institutions. The
purpose of the discussion was to propose an analytical framework, as
well as analytical themes, for future research on the effects of
globalization on institutional dimensions of global environmental
change. How the phenomena of globalization affect the characteristics of
institutions is a crucial conceptual step to connecting analytical themes
within the existing literature on institutional dimensions of global
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environmental change. The future research agenda needs to address
how the phenomena of globalization affect characteristics of institutions
designed to address institutional dimensions of global, environmental,
and societal changes.
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FfGURE I: PHENOMENA OF GLOBALIZATION AND ANALYTICAL THEMES
Note: + = induce, - = reduce
